The three-barred cross of the Russian Orthodox Church
The Kievan period
The Christian community that developed into what is now known as the Russian Orthodox Church is traditionally said to have been founded by the
Apostle Andrew, who is thought to have visited
Greek colonies along the northern coast of the
Black Sea. According to one of the legends, Andrew reached the future location of
foretold the foundation of a great Christian city.
 The spot where he reportedly erected a cross is now marked by
St. Andrew's Cathedral.
By the end of the first millennium AD, eastern
Slavic lands started to come under the cultural influence of the
Eastern Roman Empire. In 863–69, the
Byzantine Greek monks
Saint Cyril and
Saint Methodius, both from
Greek Macedonia, translated parts of the
Old Church Slavonic language for the first time, paving the way for the Christianization of the Slavs and Slavicized peoples of
Eastern Europe, the
Southern Russia. There is
evidence that the first Christian bishop was sent to Novgorod from Constantinople either by
Patriarch Photius or
Patriarch Ignatios, c. 866–67.
By the mid-10th century, there was already a Christian community among Kievan nobility, under the leadership of Byzantine Greek priests, although
paganism remained the dominant religion. Princess
Olga of Kiev was the first ruler of
Kievan Rus′ to convert to Christianity, either in 945 or 957. Her grandson,
Vladimir of Kiev, made Rus' officially a Christian state. The official
Christianization of Kievan Rus' is widely believed to have occurred in 988 AD, when Prince Vladimir was
baptised himself and ordered his people to be baptised by the priests from the
Eastern Roman Empire.
The Kievan church was a junior
metropolitanate of the
Patriarchate of Constantinople and the
Ecumenical patriarch appointed the metropolitan, who usually was a
Greek, who governed the Church of Rus'. The Metropolitan's residence was originally located in
Kiev itself, the capital of the medieval
Transfer of the see to Moscow; de facto independence of the Moscow Church
As Kiev was losing its political, cultural, and economical significance due to the
Mongol invasion, Metropolitan
Maximus moved to
Vladimir in 1299; his successor,
Metropolitan Peter moved the residence to
Moscow in 1325.
Following the tribulations of the Mongol invasion, the Russian Church was pivotal in the survival and life of the Russian state. Despite the politically motivated murders of
Mikhail of Chernigov and
Mikhail of Tver, the Mongols were generally tolerant and even granted tax exemption to the Church. Such holy figures as
Sergius of Radonezh and
Metropolitan Alexis helped the country to withstand years of
Tatar oppression, and to expand both economically and spiritually. The
Trinity monastery founded by Sergius of Radonezh became the setting for the flourishing of spiritual art, exemplified by the work of
Andrey Rublev, among others. The followers of Sergius founded four hundred monasteries, thus greatly extending the geographical extent of the
Grand Duchy of Moscow.
In 1439, at the
Council of Florence, some Orthodox hierarchs from
Byzantium as well as Metropolitan
Isidore, who represented the Russian Church, signed a
union with the
Roman Church, whereby the Eastern Church would recognise the primacy of the
Pope. However, the Moscow Prince
Vasili II rejected the act of the Council of Florence brought to Moscow by Isidore in March 1441. Isidore was in the same year removed from his position as an
apostate and expelled from Moscow. The Russian metropolitanate remained effectively vacant for the next few years due largely to the dominance of
Uniates in Constantinople then. In December 1448,
Jonas, a Russian bishop, was installed by the Council of Russian bishops in Moscow as Metropolitan of Kiev and All Russia
 (with permanent residence in Moscow) without the consent from Constantinople. This occurred five years prior to the
fall of Constantinople in 1453 and, unintentionally, signified the beginning of an effectively independent church structure in the
Moscow (North-Eastern Russian) part of the Russian Church. Subsequently, there developed a theory in Moscow that saw Moscow as the
Third Rome, the legitimate successor to Constantinople, and the Primate of the Moscow Church as head of all the Russian Church. Meanwhile, the newly established in 1458 Russian Orthodox (
initially Uniate) metropolitanate in Kiev (then in the
Grand Duchy of Lithuania and subsequently in the
Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth) continued under the jurisdiction of the Ecumenical See until 1686, when it was transferred to the jurisdiction of Moscow.
The reign of
Ivan III and his successor was plagued by a number of heresies and controversies.
One party, led by
Nil Sorsky and
Vassian Kosoy, called for the secularisation of monastic properties. They were opposed by the influential
Joseph of Volotsk, who defended ecclesiastical ownership of land and property. The sovereign's position fluctuated, but eventually he threw his support to Joseph. New sects sprang up, some of which showed a tendency to revert to
Mosaic law: for instance, the
Aleksei converted to
Judaism after meeting a certain
Zechariah the Jew.
In the 1540s, Metropolitan
Macarius codified Russian
hagiography and convened a number of church synods, which culminated in the
Hundred Chapter Council of 1551. This Council unified church ceremonies and duties throughout the Moscow Church. At the demand of the church hierarchy, the government lost its jurisdiction over ecclesiastics. Reinforced by these reforms, the Moscow Church felt powerful enough to occasionally challenge the policies of the
Philip, in particular, decried the abuses of
Ivan the Terrible, who eventually engineered his deposition and murder.
Autocephaly and schism
During the reign of Tsar
Fyodor I his brother-in-law
Boris Godunov contacted the Ecumenical Patriarch, who "was much embarrassed for want of funds,"
 with a view to establishing a patriarchal see in Moscow. As a result of Godunov's efforts,
Metropolitan Job of Moscow became in 1589 the first Patriarch of Moscow and All Rus', making the Russian Church
autocephalous. The four other patriarchs have recognized the Moscow Patriarchate as one of the five honourable Patriarchates. During the next half a century, when the tsardom was weak, the patriarchs (notably
Philaret) would help run the state along with (and sometimes instead of) the tsars.
At the urging of the
Zealots of Piety, in 1652
Patriarch Nikon of Moscow resolved to centralize power that had been distributed locally, while conforming Russian Orthodox rites and rituals to those of the
Greek Orthodox Church, as interpreted by pundits from the
Kiev Ecclesiastical Academy. For instance, he insisted that Russian Christians cross themselves with three fingers, rather than the then-traditional two. This aroused antipathy among a substantial section of believers, who saw the changed rites as heresy, although the extent to which these changes can be regarded as minor or major ritual significance remains open to debate. After the implementation of these innovations at the church council of 1666–1667, the Church
anathematized and suppressed those who acted contrary to them with the support of Muscovite state power. These traditionalists became known as "
Old Believers" or "
Although Nikon's far-flung ambitions of steering the country to a
theocratic form of government precipitated his defrocking and exile,
Tsar Aleksey deemed it reasonable to uphold many of his innovations. During the
Schism of the Russian Church, the Old Ritualists were separated from the main body of the Orthodox Church. Archpriest
Avvakum Petrov and many other opponents of the church reforms were burned at the stake, either forcibly or voluntarily. Another prominent figure within the Old Ritualists' movement,
Boyarynya Morozova, was starved to death in 1675. Others escaped from the government persecutions to
Several years after the
Council of Pereyaslav (1654) that heralded the subsequent incorporation of eastern regions of the
Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth into the
Tsardom of Russia, the see of the
Metropolitan of Kiev and all Rus' was transferred to the Moscow patriarchate (1686).
Peter the Great
Peter the Great (1682–1725) had an agenda of radical modernization of Russian government, army, dress and manners. He made Russia a formidable political power. Peter was not religious and had a low regard for the Church, so he put it under tight governmental control. He replaced the Patriarch with a Holy Synod, which he controlled. The Tsar appointed all bishops. A clerical career was not a route chosen by upper-class society. Most parish priests were sons of priests, were very poorly educated, and very poorly paid. The monks in the monasteries had a slightly higher status; they were not allowed to marry. Politically, the church was impotent. Catherine the Great later in the 18th century seized most of the church lands, and put the priests on a small salary supplemented by fees for services such as baptism and marriage.
In the late 17th and early 18th centuries, the Russian Orthodox Church experienced a vast geographic expansion. Numerous financial and political incentives (as well as immunity from military service) were offered local political leaders who would convert to Orthodoxy, and bring their people with them.
In the following two centuries, missionary efforts stretched out across Siberia into
Alaska. Eminent people on that missionary effort included St.
Innocent of Irkutsk and St.
Herman of Alaska. In emulation of
Stephen of Perm, they learned local languages and translated gospels and hymns. Sometimes those translations required the invention of new systems of transcription.
St. Sophia-Assumption Cathedral in
In the aftermath of the
Treaty of Pereyaslav, the
Ottomans (supposedly acting on behalf of the Russian regent
Sophia Alekseyevna) pressured the
Patriarch of Constantinople into transferring the
Metropoly of Kiev from the jurisdiction of Constantinople to that of Moscow. The controversial transfer brought millions of faithful and half a dozen dioceses under the pastoral and administrative care of the Patriarch of Moscow and all Rus', leading to the significant Ukrainian domination of the Russian Orthodox Church, which continued well into the 18th century, with
Stephen Yavorsky and
Demetrius of Rostov being among the most notable representatives of this trend.
In 1700, after
Patriarch Adrian's death, Peter the Great prevented a successor from being named, and in 1721, following the advice of Feofan Prokopovich, Archbishop of Pskov, the
Holy and Supreme Synod was established under Archbishop
Stephen Yavorsky to govern the church instead of a single primate. This was the situation until shortly after the
Russian Revolution of 1917, at which time the Local Council (more than half of its members being lay persons) adopted the decision to restore the Patriarchy. On November 5 (according to the Julian calendar) a new patriarch,
Tikhon, was named through
The late 18th century saw the rise of
Paisiy Velichkovsky and his disciples at the
Optina Monastery. This marked a beginning of a significant spiritual revival in the Russian Church after a lengthy period of modernization, personified by such figures as
Demetrius of Rostov and
Platon of Moscow.
Ivan Kireevsky and other lay theologians with
Slavophile leanings elaborated some key concepts of the renovated Orthodox doctrine, including that of
sobornost. The resurgence of Eastern Orthodoxy was reflected in Russian literature, an example is the figure of
Fin-de-siècle religious renaissance
Russian Orthodox church in
, built in the 1870s
During the final decades of the imperial order in Russia many educated Russians sought to return to the church and tried to bring their faith back to life. No less evident were non-conformist paths of spiritual searching known as "God-Seeking". Writers, artists and intellectuals in large numbers were drawn to private prayer, mysticism,
theosophy and Eastern religions. A fascination with primitive feeling, with the unconscious and the mythic was apparent, along with visions of coming catastrophes and redemption.
In 1909, a volume of essays appeared under the title
Vekhi ("Milestones" or "Landmarks"), authored by a group of leading left-wing intellectuals, including
Peter Struve and former
Marxists. They bluntly repudiated the materialism and atheism that had dominated the thought of the intelligentsia for generations as leading inevitably to failure and moral disaster. The essays created a sensation.
It is possible to see a similarly renewed vigor and variety in religious life and spirituality among the lower classes, especially after the upheavals of 1905. Among the peasantry there was widespread interest in spiritual-ethical literature and non-conformist moral-spiritual movements, an upsurge in pilgrimage and other devotions to sacred spaces and objects (especially icons), persistent beliefs in the presence and power of the supernatural (apparitions, possession, walking-dead, demons, spirits, miracles and magic), the renewed vitality of local "ecclesial communities" actively shaping their own ritual and spiritual lives, sometimes in the absence of clergy, and defining their own sacred places and forms of piety. Also apparent was the proliferation of what the Orthodox establishment branded as "sectarianism", including both non-Orthodox Christian denominations, notably
Baptists, and various forms of popular Orthodoxy and mysticism.
Russian revolution and Civil War
In 1914, there were 55,173 Russian Orthodox
churches and 29,593
monasteries and 475
convents with a total of 95,259 monks and nuns in Russia.
The year 1917 was a major turning point in Russian history, and also the Russian Orthodox Church.
 In early March 1917 (O.S.), the Emperor was
forced to abdicate, the
Russian empire began to implode, and the government′s direct control of the Church was all but over by August 1917. On 15 August (O.S.), in the Moscow
Dormition Cathedral in the Kremlin, the
Local (Pomestniy) Council of the ROC, the first such convention since the late 17th century, opened. The Council continued its sessions until September 1918 and adopted a number of important reforms, including the restoration of
Patriarchy, a decision taken 3 days after the
overthrew the Provisional Government in Petrograd on 25 October (O.S.). On 5 November, Metroplitan
Tikhon of Moscow was selected as the first Russian Patriarch after about 300 years of the Synodal rule.
In early February 1918, the Bolshevik-controlled government of Soviet Russia enacted the
Decree on separation of church from state and school from church that proclaimed
separation of church and state in Russia, freedom to ″profess any religion or profess none″, deprived religious organisations of the right to own any property and legal status. Legal religious activity in the territories controlled by Bolsheviks was effectively reduced to services and sermons inside church buildings. The Decree and attempts by Bolshevik officials to requisition church property caused sharp resentment on the part of the ROC clergy and provoked violent clashes on some occasions: on 1 February (19 January O.S.), hours after the bloody confrontation in Petrograd′s
Alexander Nevsky Lavra between the Bolsheviks trying to take control of the monastery′s premises and the believers,
Patriarch Tikhon issued a proclamation that
anathematised the perpetrators of such acts.
The Church was caught in the crossfire of the
Russian Civil War that began later in 1918, and Church leadership, despite their attempts to be politically neutral (from the autumn of 1918), as well as the clergy generally were perceived by the Soviet authorities as a "counter-revolutionary" force and thus subject to suppression and eventual liquidation.
In the first five years after the Bolshevik revolution, 28 bishops and 1,200 priests were executed.
Under Soviet rule
The Soviet Union, formally created in December 1922, was the first state to have elimination of religion as an ideological objective espoused by the country′s ruling political party. Toward that end, the Communist regime confiscated church property, ridiculed religion, harassed believers, and propagated materialism and atheism in schools. Actions toward particular religions, however, were determined by State interests, and most organized religions were never outlawed.
Orthodox clergy and active believers were treated by the Soviet law-enforcement apparatus as anti-revolutionary elements and were habitually subjected to formal prosecutions on political charges, arrests, exiles,
imprisonment in camps, and later could also be incarcerated in
Thousands of church buildings and initially all the monasteries were taken over by the Soviet government and either destroyed or converted to secular use. It was impossible to build new churches. Practising Orthodox Christians were restricted from prominent careers and membership in communist organizations (the party, the
Komsomol). Anti-religious propaganda was openly sponsored and encouraged by the government, which the Church was not given an opportunity to publicly respond to. The government youth organization, the
Komsomol, encouraged its members to vandalize Orthodox churches and harass worshippers. Seminaries were closed down, and the church was restricted from using the press. Theological schools were closed (until some were re-opened in the latter 1940s), and church publications were suppressed.
However, the Soviet policy vis-a-vis organised religion vacillated over time between, on the one hand, a utopian determination to substitute secular rationalism for what they considered to be an outmoded "superstitious" worldview and, on the other, pragmatic acceptance of the tenaciousness of religious faith and institutions. In any case, religious beliefs and practices did persist, not only in the domestic and private spheres but also in the scattered public spaces allowed by a state that recognized its failure to eradicate religion and the political dangers of an unrelenting culture war.
The Russian Orthodox church was drastically weakened in May 1922, when the
Renovated (Living) Church, a reformist movement backed by the Soviet secret police, broke away from Patriarch Tikhon (also see the
Josephites and the
Russian True Orthodox Church), a move that caused division among clergy and faithful that persisted until 1946.
The sixth sector of the
OGPU, led by
Yevgeny Tuchkov, began aggressively arresting and executing bishops, priests, and devout worshippers, such as Metropolitan Veniamin in Petrograd in 1922 for refusing to accede to the demand to hand in church valuables (including sacred relics). In the time between 1927 and 1940, the number of Orthodox Churches in the Russian Republic fell from 29,584 to less than 500. Between 1917 and 1935, 130,000 Orthodox priests were arrested. Of these, 95,000 were put to death. Many thousands of victims of persecution became recognized in a special canon of saints known as the "
new martyrs and confessors of Russia".
When Patriarch Tikhon died in 1925, the Soviet authorities forbade patriarchal election. Patriarchal locum tenens (acting Patriarch)
Metropolitan Sergius (Stragorodsky, 1887–1944), going against the opinion of a major part of the church's parishes, in 1927 issued a declaration accepting the Soviet authority over the church as legitimate, pledging the church's cooperation with the government and condemning political dissent within the church. By this declaration Sergius granted himself authority that he, being a deputy of imprisoned
Metropolitan Peter and acting against his will, had no right to assume according to the XXXIV
Apostolic canon, which led to a split with the
Russian Orthodox Church Outside Russia abroad and the
Russian True Orthodox Church (Russian Catacomb Church) within the Soviet Union, as they allegedly remained faithful to the Canons of the Apostles, declaring the part of the church led by Metropolitan Sergius
schism, sometimes coined Sergianism. Due to this canonical disagreement it is disputed which church has been the legitimate successor to the Russian Orthodox Church that had existed before 1925.
In 1927, Metropolitan
Eulogius (Georgiyevsky) of Paris broke with the ROCOR (along with Metropolitan
Platon (Rozhdestvensky) of New York, leader of the Russian Metropolia in America). In 1930, after taking part in a prayer service in London in supplication for Christians suffering under the Soviets, Evlogy was removed from office by Sergius and replaced. Most of Evlogy's parishes in Western Europe remained loyal to him; Evlogy then petitioned Ecumenical Patriarch
Photius II to be received under his canonical care and was received in 1931, making a number of parishes of Russian Orthodox Christians outside Russia esp. in Western Europe an
Exarchate of the Ecumenical Patriarchate as the
Archdiocese of Russian Orthodox churches in Western Europe.
Moreover, in the
1929 elections, the Orthodox Church attempted to formulate itself as a full-scale opposition group to the Communist Party, and attempted to run candidates of its own against the Communist candidates. Article 124 of the
1936 Soviet Constitution officially allowed for freedom of religion within the Soviet Union, and along with initial statements of it being a multi-candidate election, the Church again attempted to run its own religious candidates in the
1937 elections. However the support of multicandidate elections was retracted several months before the elections were held and in neither 1929 nor 1937 were any candidates of the Orthodox Church elected.
Nazi Germany's attack on the Soviet Union in 1941, Joseph Stalin revived the Russian Orthodox Church to intensify patriotic support for the war effort. On September 4, 1943, Metropolitans Sergius (Stragorodsky),
Alexius (Simansky) and
Nicholas (Yarushevich) had a meeting with Stalin and received a permission to convene a council on September 8, 1943, which elected Sergius Patriarch of Moscow and all the Rus'. This is considered by some as violation of the XXX
Apostolic canon, as no church hierarch could be consecrated by secular authorities.
 A new patriarch was elected, theological schools were opened, and thousands of churches began to function. The
Moscow Theological Academy Seminary, which had been closed since 1918, was re-opened.
In December 2017
Security Service of Ukraine lifted classified top secret status of documents reveals that the
NKGB of the USSR and its units in the Union and autonomous republics, territories and regions were engaged in the selection of candidates for participation in the council from the representatives of the clergy and the laity. To this end, it was necessary to outline "persons who have religious authority among the clergy and believers, and at the same time checked for civic or patriotic work".
"It is important to ensure that the number of nominated candidates is dominated by the agents of the NKGB, capable of holding the line that we need at the Council," the letter sent in September 1944 to the place signed by the head of the 2nd Directorate of the NKGB of the USSR Fedotov and the head of the Fifth Division 2nd Directorate of Karpov.
Between 1945 and 1959 the official organization of the church was greatly expanded, although individual members of the clergy were occasionally arrested and exiled. The number of open churches reached 25,000. By 1957 about 22,000 Russian Orthodox churches had become active. But in 1959 Nikita Khrushchev initiated his own campaign against the Russian Orthodox Church and forced the closure of about 12,000 churches. By 1985 fewer than 7,000 churches remained active. Members of the church hierarchy were jailed or forced out, their places taken by docile clergy, many of whom had ties with the KGB. This decline was evident from the dramatic decay of many of the abandoned churches and monasteries that were previously common in even the smallest villages from the pre-revolutionary period.
Persecution under Khrushchev
A new and widespread persecution of the church was subsequently instituted under the leadership of Nikita Khrushchev and Leonid Brezhnev. A second round of repression, harassment and church closures took place between 1959 and 1964 when
Nikita Khrushchev was in office. Several thousand churches were closed or demolished, priests, monks and faithful were killed or imprisoned and the number of functioning monasteries was reduced to less than twenty.
Subsequent to Khrushchev's overthrow, the Church and the government remained on unfriendly terms until 1988. In practice, the most important aspect of this conflict was that openly religious people could not join the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union, which meant that they could not hold any political office. However, among the general population, large numbers remained religious.
Some Orthodox believers and even priests took part in the
dissident movement and became
prisoners of conscience. The Orthodox priests
Gleb Yakunin, Sergiy Zheludkov and others spent years in Soviet prisons and exile for their efforts in defending freedom of worship.
 Among the prominent figures of that time were Father
 and Father
Aleksandr Men. Although he tried to keep away from practical work of the dissident movement intending to better fulfil his calling as a priest, there was a spiritual link between Fr Aleksandr and many of the dissidents. For some of them he was a friend; for others, a godfather; for many (including
Yakunin), a spiritual father.
By 1987 the number of functioning churches in the
Soviet Union had fallen to 6,893 and the number of functioning monasteries to just 18. In 1987 in the
Russian SFSR, between 40% and 50% of newborn babies (depending on the region) were baptized. Over 60% of all deceased received Christian funeral services.
Glasnost and evidence of KGB links
Beginning in the late 1980s, under Mikhail Gorbachev, the new political and social freedoms resulted in many church buildings being returned to the church, to be restored by local parishioners. A pivotal point in the history of the Russian Orthodox Church came in 1988, the millennial anniversary of the
Baptism of Kievan Rus'. Throughout the summer of that year, major government-supported celebrations took place in Moscow and other cities; many older churches and some monasteries were reopened. An implicit ban on religious propaganda on state TV was finally lifted. For the first time in the history of the Soviet Union, people could see live transmissions of church services on television.
Gleb Yakunin, a critic of the
Moscow Patriarchate who was one of those who briefly gained access to the
KGB archive documents in the early 1990s, argued that the Moscow Patriarchate was "practically a subsidiary, a sister company of the KGB".
 Critics charge that the archives showed the extent of active participation of the top ROC hierarchs in the KGB efforts overseas.
George Trofimoff, the highest-ranking US military officer ever indicted for, and convicted of,
espionage by the
United States and sentenced to
life imprisonment on September 27, 2001, had been "recruited into the service of the KGB"
 by Igor Susemihl (a.k.a. Zuzemihl), a bishop in the Russian Orthodox Church (subsequently, a high-ranking hierarch—the ROC Metropolitan Iriney of
Vienna, who died in July 1999
Konstanin Kharchev, former chairman of the Soviet Council on Religious Affairs, explained: "Not a single candidate for the office of bishop or any other high-ranking office, much less a member of Holy Synod, went through without confirmation by the Central Committee of the
CPSU and the
 Professor Nathaniel Davis points out: "If the bishops wished to defend their people and survive in office, they had to collaborate to some degree with the KGB, with the commissioners of the Council for Religious Affairs, and with other party and governmental authorities".
 Patriarch Alexy II, acknowledged that compromises were made with the Soviet government by bishops of the Moscow Patriarchate, himself included, and publicly repented of these compromises.
Post-Soviet recovery and problems
Under Patriarch Aleksey II (1990–2008)
Alexy (Ridiger) of
Leningrad, ascended the patriarchal throne in 1990 and presided over the partial return of Orthodox Christianity to Russian society after 70 years of repression, transforming the ROC to something resembling its pre-communist appearance; some 15,000 churches had been re-opened or built by the end of his tenure, and the process of recovery and rebuilding has continued under his successor
Patriarch Kirill. According to figures released on March 2, 2011, the Church had 164 dioceses, 217 bishops, and 30,675 parishes served by 28,934 priests and 3,625 deacons. There were 805 monasteries and 30 theological schools.
The Russian Church also sought to fill the ideological vacuum left by the
collapse of Communism and even, in the opinion of some analysts, became "a separate branch of power".
In August 2000, the ROC adopted its Basis of the Social Concept
 and in July 2008, its Basic Teaching on Human Dignity, Freedom and Rights.
Under Patriarch Aleksey, there were difficulties in the relationship between the Russian Orthodox Church and the
Vatican, especially since 2002, when
Pope John Paul II created a
Catholic diocesan structure for Russian territory. The leaders of the Russian Church saw this action as a throwback to prior attempts by the Vatican to
proselytize the Russian Orthodox faithful to become Roman Catholic. This point of view was based upon the stance of the Russian Orthodox Church (and the
Eastern Orthodox Church) that the Church of Rome is in schism, after breaking off from the Orthodox Church. The Roman Catholic Church, on the other hand, while acknowledging the primacy of the Russian Orthodox Church in Russia, believed that the small Roman Catholic minority in Russia, in continuous existence since at least the 18th century, should be served by a fully developed church hierarchy with a presence and status in Russia, just as the Russian Orthodox Church is present in other countries (including constructing a cathedral in Rome, near the
There occurred strident conflicts with the Ecumenical Patriarchate, most notably over the Orthodox Church in
Estonia in the mid-1990s, which resulted in unilateral suspension of eucharistic relationship between the churches by the ROC.
 The tension lingered on and could be observed at the meeting in Ravenna in early October 2007 of participants in the Orthodox–Catholic Dialogue: the representative of the Moscow Patriarchate, Bishop
Hilarion Alfeyev, walked out of the meeting due to the presence of representatives from the
Estonian Apostolic Orthodox Church which is in the jurisdiction of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. At the meeting, prior to the departure of the Russian delegation, there were also substantive disagreements about the wording of a proposed joint statement among the Orthodox representatives.
 After the departure of the Russian delegation, the remaining Orthodox delegates approved the form which had been advocated by the representatives of the Ecumenical Patriarchate.
 The Ecumenical See's representative in Ravenna said that Hilarion's position "should be seen as an expression of authoritarianism whose goal is to exhibit the influence of the Moscow Church. But like last year in Belgrade, all Moscow achieved was to isolate itself once more since no other Orthodox Church followed its lead, remaining instead faithful to Constantinople."
Michael Bourdeaux, former president of the
Keston Institute, said in January 2008 that "the Moscow Patriarchate acts as though it heads a state church, while the few Orthodox clergy who oppose the church-state symbiosis face severe criticism, even loss of livelihood."
 Such a view is backed up by other observers of Russian political life.
 Clifford J. Levy of
The New York Times wrote in April 2008: "Just as the government has tightened control over political life, so, too, has it intruded in matters of faith. The Kremlin's surrogates in many areas have turned the Russian Orthodox Church into a de facto official religion, warding off other Christian denominations that seem to offer the most significant competition for worshipers. […] This close alliance between the government and the Russian Orthodox Church has become a defining characteristic of Mr. Putin's tenure, a mutually reinforcing choreography that is usually described here as working '
Throughout Patriarch Alexy's reign, the massive program of costly restoration and reopening of devastated churches and monasteries (as well as the construction of new ones) was criticized for having eclipsed the church's principal mission of evangelizing.
On 5 December 2008, the day of Patriarch Alexy's death, the
Financial Times said: "While the church had been a force for liberal reform under the Soviet Union, it soon became a center of strength for conservatives and nationalists in the post-communist era. Alexei's death could well result in an even more conservative church."
Under Patriarch Kirill
On 27 January 2009, the
ROC Local Council elected Metropolitan
Kirill of Smolensk Patriarch of Moscow and All Rus′ by 508 votes out of a total of 700.
 He was enthroned on 1 February 2009.
Patriarch Kirill implemented reforms in the administrative structure of the Moscow Patriarchate: on 27 July 2011 the Holy Synod established the Central Asian Metropolitan District, reorganizing the structure of the Church in Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan.
 In addition, on 6 October 2011, at the request of the Patriarch, the Holy Synod introduced the metropoly (Russian: митрополия, mitropoliya), administrative structure bringing together neighboring eparchies.
The Church has close ties with the Kremlin including the patronage of
Vladimir Putin, who has mobilized religion both inside and outside Russian borders. In cultural and social affairs Putin has collaborated closely with the Church. Patriarch Kirill endorsed Putin's election in 2012, stating Putin's terms were like "a miracle of God."
 Steven Myers reports, "The church, once heavily repressed, had emerged from the Soviet collapse as one of the most respected institutions....Now Kiril led the faithful directly into an alliance with the state."
 Mark Woods provides specific examples of how the Kirill has backed the expansion of Russian power into Crimea and eastern Ukraine.
 More broadly the New York Times reports in September 2016 how that Church's policy prescriptions support the Kremlin's appeal to social conservatives:
- A fervent foe of homosexuality and any attempt to put individual rights above those of family, community or nation, the Russian Orthodox Church helps project Russia as the natural ally of all those who pine for a more secure, illiberal world free from the tradition-crushing rush of globalization, multiculturalism and women’s and gay rights.
While the ROC officially is critical of nationalism, critics of the church allege that it promotes anti-liberalism and is host to numerous groups that promote nationalist and anti-Western tendencies.
 Besides, the ROC is viewed with suspicion by many Russians because of its allegiance to the erstwhile communist regime and connection to the KGB. It also faces the spread of a variety of religious movements in Russia, which directly challenge its former predominance.